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Abstract 
This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of causes of cost 
escalation in transport infrastructure projects. The study is based on a sample of 258 
rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the 
dependence of cost escalation on (1) length of project implementation phase, (2) size of 
project and (3) type of project ownership. First, it is found with very high statistical 
significance that cost escalation is strongly dependent on length of implementation 
phase. The policy implications are clear: Decision makers and planners should be 
highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate 
into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, it is found that projects have grown 
larger over time and that for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage 
cost escalations. Finally, by comparing cost escalation for three types of project 
ownership--private, state-owned enterprise and other public ownership--it is shown that 
the oft-seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective 
in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. Type of accountability appears to 
matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.  
 
Keywords: Cost overrun, construction delays, project size, project ownership,  
privatization,  state-owned enterprise, accountability. 
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Cost escalation and its causes 
On the basis of the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transport 
infrastructure projects, in a previous article we showed that cost escalation is a 
pervasive phenomenon in transport infrastructure projects across project types, 
geographical location and historical period (Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl, forthcoming). 
More specifically we showed the following (all conclusions highly significant and most 
likely conservative):  
 
• Nine out of ten transport infrastructure projects fall victim to cost escalation 
(N=258). 
• For rail average cost escalation is 45% (N=58, sd=38). 
• For fixed links (bridges and tunnels) average cost escalation is 34% (N=33, 
sd=62). 
• For roads average cost escalation is 20% (N=167, sd=30). 
• For all project types average cost escalation is 28% (N=258, sd=39). 
• Cost escalation exists across 20 nations and five continents; it appears to be a 
global phenomenon (N=258). 
• Cost escalation appears to be more pronounced in developing nations than in 
North America and Europe (N=58, data for rail only). 
• Cost escalation has not decreased over the past 70 years. No learning seems to 
take place (N=111/246). 
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The sample used to arrive at these results is the largest of its kind, covering 258 
transport infrastructure projects in 20 nations worth approximately US$90 billion (1995 
prices). In the present article we use this sample to analyse causes of cost escalation in 
transport infrastructure projects. By 'cause' we mean 'to result in'; the cause is not the 
explanation of the result. The main purpose of this article has been to identify which 
factors cause the cost escalation, to a lesser degree the reasons behind why they cause 
it. We test how cost escalation is affected by three variables: (1) length of 
implementation phase measured in years, (2) size of project measured in costs and (3) 
three types of ownership including public and private. In addition, we test whether 
projects grow larger over time. Results from a separate study of political explanations 
of cost escalation have been published in Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002). 
 For all 258 projects in the sample we have data on percentage cost overrun. 
When we combine percentage cost overrun with other variables, for instance length of 
implementation phase, the number of projects becomes lower because data on other 
variables is not available for all 258 projects. For each added variable, we mention 
below for how many projects of the 258 data is available. As far as possible, all projects 
are used in each analysis. In no case have we omitted available data, except for the 
mentioned cases of outliers. Ordinary analysis of variance and regression analysis have 
been used for analysing the data. When talking about significance below, we use the 
conventional terms: very strong significance (p<0.001), strong significance 
(0.001≤p<0.01), significant (0.01≤p<0.05), nearly significant (0.05≤p<0.1) and non-
significant (0.1≤p). 
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 The present article is a companion paper to our article "How common and how 
large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects?", published in TRV 23(1), 
pp. 71-88, 2003. For a full description of the sample, data collection and methodology, 
we refer readers to the previously published article. 
 
Are sluggish projects more expensive? 
The Commission of the European Union recently observed that the 'inherent 
sluggishness' of the preparation, planning, authorisation and evaluation procedures for 
large infrastructure projects creates obstacles to the implementation of such projects 
(Commission of the European Union 1993: 76). There is a fear that obstacles in the 
planning and implementation phases translate into cost escalation, if they do not block 
projects altogether (Ardity, Akan and Gurdamar 1985, Morris and Hough 1987, Snow 
and Dinesen 1994, Chan and Kumaraswamy 1997). 
We decided to test whether such fear is corroborated by the empirical evidence. 
More specifically, we decided to test the thesis that projects with longer implementation 
phases tend to have larger cost escalations. We here define length of implementation 
phase as is common, i.e. as the time period from decision to build until construction is 
completed and operations have begun. Cost development is defined as the difference 
between actual and forecast construction costs in percentage of forecast construction 
costs.  
Information about length of implementation phase is available for 111 of the 
258 rail, fixed link (bridges and tunnels) and road projects for which we have data on 
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cost development (38 out of 58 rail, 33 of 33 fixed link, 40 of 167 road projects). Figure 
1 shows the dependence of cost escalation on length of implementation phase. The 
figure suggests that there is a statistical relationship between length of implementation 
phase and cost escalation where a longer implementation phase tends to result in a 
larger cost escalation. Statistical tests corroborate this impression. The tests have been 
carried out with and without projects with implementation phases of 13 years and 
longer. The reason for the 13 year cut-off is that the assumptions for the regression 
analysis do not seem to be fulfilled for projects of longer duration, mainly linearity and 
homoscedasticity. Projects with implementation phases of 13 years and longer can be 
considered statistical outliers. This is revealed by residual plots and is most obvious for 
bridges and tunnels. For uniformity, the cut-off has been done for all groups. When the 
outliers are included, the results of analyses are less sharp, due to higher statistical 
error. 
 
[Figure 1 app. here] 
 
For the 101 projects with implementation phases known to be less than 13 years 
we find a highly significant dependence of cost escalation on length of implementation 
phase (p<0.001, t-test). The null hypothesis that length of implementation phase has no 
effect on cost escalation is falsified. Longer implementation phases significantly tend to 
translate into larger percentage cost escalations. The influence of length of 
implementation phase on cost escalation is not statistically different for rail, fixed link 
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(bridges and tunnels) and road projects, respectively (p=0.159). We have chosen to treat 
the three types of projects on aggregate. Three regression lines could be given, one for 
each project type. However, the null hypothesis of a common regression line is in 
conformity with the data and gives a simpler model. The p-value is low but not close to 
0.05. The regression line for cost escalation as a function of length of implementation 
phase is shown in Figure 1.  
 The equation for the regression line is:  
 
 ∆C  =  0.4 + 4.64*T 
 
where 
 
 ∆C  =  Cost escalation in % (fixed prices) 
 T  =  Length of implementation phase in years. 
 
The detailed statistics are:  
 Intercept: mean = 0.448, sd=8.258, t=0.054, p=0.957. 
  Slope: mean= 4.636, sd=1.279, t=3.626, p=0.00048. 
  R-square = 0.1172. 
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The 95% confidence interval for the slope is 2.10 to 7.17. The confidence interval gives 
the uncertainty of the analysis. It is of course important that zero is not included in the 
interval. 
Given the available evidence, we see that for every passing year from the 
decision to build a project until construction ends and operations begin, we must expect 
the project to incur an average increase in cost escalation of 4.64 percentage points. 
Thus for a 1 billion dollar project, each year of delay would cost on average 46 million 
dollars. For a project in the size-range of the Channel tunnel between France and the 
UK, the expected average cost of delay would be approximately 350 million dollars per 
year, or about a million dollars per day.  
We note that these figures include only construction costs, i.e. not financing 
costs. With financing costs included the figures would be considerably higher and 
would be even more sensitive to the time factor, because financing costs consist mainly 
of accrued interests. Financing costs are particularly sensitive to long delays, because 
delays defer income while interest, and interest of interest, keep accumulating. Long 
delays may result in projects ending up in the so-called 'interest trap', where a 
combination of escalating construction costs, delays and increasing interest payments 
result in a situation where income from a project cannot cover costs. This has happened, 
for instance, for the two longest underwater rail tunnels in Europe, the Channel tunnel 
and the Danish Great Belt rail link, which both had to be financially reorganised. The 
Øresund link between Sweden and Denmark has also run into problems of this kind, but 
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it is too early in the life of this project, which opened in 2000, to say whether the result 
will be financial non-viability (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter 2003). 
 The average length of implementation phase is significantly different for 
different types of projects (p=0.002, F-test). Figure 2 shows a box plot for type of 
project and length of implementation phase. Fixed link projects (bridges and tunnels) 
have the longest implementation phase with an average of 6.6 years (sd=3.4), followed 
by rail projects with 6.3 years (sd=3.3) and roads with 4.3 years (sd=2.2). 
Consequently, cost escalation must be expected to be different for the three types of 
projects, and especially for road projects compared with rail and fixed link projects, 
because the length of implementation phases are different. 
 When considering the possibility of third factor or omitted variable effects on 
the results, one might speculate that the complexity of projects may be of importance to 
the size of cost escalations, i.e. some projects turn out to be more complex and this may 
result in larger cost escalations for such projects. Complexity is difficult to 
operationalise for statistical analysis, but the sample does not seem to include a bias 
concerning complexity. Thus the results appear to reflect differences between projects 
regarding length of implementation phase and not regarding complexity. Further 
investigations of complexity could be interesting but would involve other methods of 
analysis than those employed here. 
 
[Figure 2 app. here] 
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 In sum, excluding the most sluggish projects, i.e. those with an implementation 
phase of 13 years and longer, there is no statistical evidence that group of project has 
influence on cost escalation besides what can be explained by sluggishness. Length of 
implementation phase is the essential predictor and, as long as more evidence has not 
been found, it must be considered a stand-alone. Knowing length of implementation 
phase, we do not need to distinguish between rail, fixed link and road projects. It should 
be mentioned, however, that this conclusion is based on only the 111 projects for which 
information on length of implementation phase was available out of the 258 projects in 
the complete sample. Further, for the most sluggish projects the data do not allow firm 
conclusions. If we do not know length of implementation phase and only the project 
type is given, then road projects would have less cost escalation than fixed link projects. 
The important result to note here, however, is that if information on implementation 
duration is given, project type is not important. 
 Introducing into the analysis the geographical location of projects--in Europe, 
North America and other geographical areas, respectively--we find, firstly, that the 
influence of geographical location on length of implementation phase (cost escalation 
not considered) was very strong and statistically significant for fixed links and roads, 
with North America showing shorter implementation phases than other geographical 
areas (p<0.001). For rail there was no significant relationship. Secondly, we find that if 
length of implementation phase and geographical location are both known, then the 
same regression lines can be used for the three types of geographical location, with the 
proviso that only rail projects are included in our study for 'other geographical areas'. 
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The regression lines can be assumed to be parallel (see below for an explanation of why 
the slope for all projects above is different from the slope of the parallel lines for 
geographical areas): 
 
Europe:   ∆C  =  14.2 + 3.28*T 
North America:  ∆C  =  -1.3 + 3.28*T 
Other geographical areas: ∆C  =  56.2 + 3.28*T 
 
where 
 
 ∆C  =  Cost escalation in % (fixed prices) 
 T  =  Length of implementation phase in years. 
 
The 95% confidence interval for the slope is 0.58 to 5.97. The p-value for parallellity is 
p=0.967 Whereas the deviation of intercept for other geographical areas is significant, 
the difference in intercept between Europe and North America is only close to being 
significant (p=0.077). Further research is needed on this point. Logarithmic 
relationships were considered but rejected.  
 One may wonder why the slope is lower for the geographically subdivided data 
than for the undivided data. It is easy to see why this must be the case by conceiving 
three parallel 'clouds' of data points, one for each of the three geographical regions. 
Drawing one common regression line for all data points necessarily results in a slope 
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higher than that of the regression lines for each individual 'cloud'. The observant reader 
may also observe that when considering to build a specific project, decision makers 
typically know in which geographical area the project would be located and that, 
therefore, the slope of 3.28 is more relevant in this case than the average slope for the 
whole dataset of 4.64. 
In conclusion, the dependence of cost escalation on length of implementation phase is 
firmly established for transport infrastructure projects. We conclude, therefore, that 
there is good reason to be concerned about sluggish planning and implementation of 
such projects. Sluggishness may, quite simply, be extremely expensive. Consequently, 
before a project owner decides to go ahead and build a project, every effort should be 
made to conduct preparation, planning, authorisation and ex ante evaluation in a manner 
where such problems are negotiated and eliminated that may otherwise resurface as 
delays during implementation. Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003) describe 
ways in which this may be achieved. Similarly, after the decision to build a project, it is 
of crucial importance that the project organisation and project management are set up 
and operated in ways that minimise the risk of delays. If those responsible for a project 
fail to take such precautions aimed at pro-actively preventing delays and long 
implementation phases, the evidence indicate that the financiers--be they tax payers or 
private investors--are likely to be severely penalised in terms of cost escalations of a 
magnitude that could threaten project viability. 
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Do bigger projects have bigger cost escalations? 
Based on the results of the previous section, one might speculate that larger projects 
would have larger percentage cost escalations than smaller projects, because, other 
things being equal, implementation phases would be longer for larger projects with 
resulting increases in cost escalation. The question is, in short, whether larger projects 
are sluggish projects and therefore more prone to cost escalation?  
Both the research literature and the media occasionally claim that the track 
record is poorer for larger projects than for smaller ones and that cost escalations for 
large projects are particularly common and especially large (Merewitz 1973: 278; Ellis 
1985; Morris and Hough 1987: 1, 7). Until now it has been difficult or impossible to 
rigorously test such claims because data that would allow tests have been unavailable or 
wanting.  
With the new and larger sample of data collected for the research reported in 
this article, we therefore decided to test whether cost escalation significantly vary with 
size of project. Forecast and not actual construction costs should be used here as 
measure of size of project for the following two reasons. First, cost escalation is 
statistically confounded with actual construction costs, being part of it, whereas forecast 
construction costs are not. Second, the decision regarding whether to go ahead with a 
given project is based on forecast construction costs; this is the decision variable, not 
actual costs.  
 As mentioned, we have percentage cost overrun for 258 projects. If we ask for 
the additional information, how is percentage cost overrun made up of forecasted and 
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actual costs, this info is available for 131 of the 258 projects. Figure 3 shows the plot of 
percentage cost escalation against project size, with indication of project type, for these 
131 projects. The plot shows no immediate dependence between the two variables. It 
also does not substantiate any thesis of different variability for smaller and larger 
projects. Analysis of covariance indicate that project types should be treated separately. 
Dummy variables could be used but are more error-prone in interpretation than the 
analysis presented below.  
 Tests done separately for rail, fixed link and road projects, show a nearly 
significant relationship between cost escalation and project size for fixed link projects 
(p=0.085), whereas there is no indication that percentage cost escalation depends on 
project size for road and rail projects (p=0.330 and p=0.496, respectively). If we refine 
the analyses further by again treating as statistical outliers projects with implementation 
phases of 13 years and longer, then percentage cost escalation significantly depends on 
project size for fixed links, with larger fixed links having larger percentage cost 
escalations (p=0.022). The regression line for fixed links without two statistical outliers 
is: 
 
 ∆C  =  -28.9 + 23.0*log10(C0) 
 
where 
 
 ∆C  =  Cost escalation in % (fixed prices) 
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 C0  = Forecast costs of project (1995 level euros) 
 
We conclude that for bridges and tunnels the available data support the claim that 
bigger projects have bigger percentage cost escalations, whereas this appear not to be 
the case for road and rail projects. For all project types, bigger projects do not have a 
larger risk of cost escalation than do smaller ones; the risk of cost escalation is high for 
all project sizes and types. We also conclude that the divisibility argument--that road 
and rail projects may have lower percentage cost overruns because they often can be 
phased in, whilst bridges and tunnels are only available once completed--is not 
supported by the data. Generally, the road projects are smallest. For fixed link and rail 
projects, Figure 3 indicates that the difference (between fixed link and rail projects) is 
significant also for large projects. The mega fixed link projects (actually the Channel 
tunnel and Great Belt bridge) do not have exceptional percentage cost overruns, a 
conclusion which runs counter to the divisibility argument. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that tests of correlation between project size and length of implementation 
phase show no significant results. 
 
[Figure 3 app. here] 
 
Do projects grow larger over time? 
Project size matters to cost escalation, we found above for bridges and tunnels. But 
even for projects where increased size correlate with neither bigger percentage cost 
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escalations nor larger risks of escalation, as we found for rail and road projects, we wish 
to point out that there may be good practical reasons to pay more attention to--and use 
more resources to prevent--cost escalation in larger projects than in smaller ones. For 
instance, a cost escalation of, say, 50% in a 5 billion dollar project would typically 
cause more problems in terms of budgetary, fiscal, administrative and political 
dilemmas than would the same percentage escalation in a project costing, say, 5 million 
dollars. If project promoters and owners wish to avoid such problems, special attention 
must be paid to cost escalation for larger projects. 
 On this background we analysed the size of projects over time. Figure 4 shows 
the costs of projects plotted against year of completion. The figure is based on actual 
costs in order to show the real, as opposed to the budgeted, size of projects. Actual costs 
correspond to year of completion, which are also shown in the figure.  
 
[Figure 4 app. here] 
 
 Correlation between time and cost is not immediately clear from figure 4. On 
closer statistical analyses, however, it turns out there is a significant increase over time 
in the size of road projects. The visual appearance of the data in the figure is rather 
different for the different types of projects, calling for different types of statistical 
analysis. Rail and road projects cluster in two groups according to year of completion, 
the road projects more distinctly. We have applied both a regression analysis and a two-
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sample comparison for these projects. For road projects, the regression line is (corrected 
for a statistical outlier): 
 
 log10(C1)  =  1.230 + 0.0098*(T - 1970) 
 
where 
 
 C1  =  Actual costs of project (1995 level euros) 
 T  =  Year of completion of project 
 
corresponding to a 2.3% rise in project size each year, equivalent to a doubling in size 
in 30.8 years. The rise is statistically significant (p=0.011). There are two clusters of 
road projects with time spans 1954-1964 and 1987-1996. Using a two-sample 
comparison we find a significant increase in project size of 82.6% over the 32 years 
between the two clusters, corresponding to an annual increase of 1.9% (p=0.034, 
Welch's t-test). 
 For rail projects, the regression line is: 
 
 log10(C1)  =  2.43 + 0.0060*(T - 1970) 
 
corresponding to an annual increase in project size of 1.4%. But now the rise is 
nonsignificant (p=0.582). Welch's two-sample test also produces a nonsignificant result. 
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 For fixed links, the regression line is: 
 
 log10(C1)  =  2.322 + 0.0083*(T - 1970) 
 
corresponding to a 1.9% rise in size each year. The result is non-significant, however 
(p=0.131). Two-sample testing is not suitable here. 
 Given the available evidence, we conclude that projects are growing larger over 
time, but only for road projects is such growth statistically significant. This may be 
explained by the fact that bridges, tunnels and rail projects tend to be larger and less 
divisible than road projects. Thus rail and fixed link projects have been large all along 
for the period under study and therefore have less scope for high percentage increases in 
size than road projects.  
 Granted the fact that project size is increasing, and granted that the same 
percentage cost escalation will typically cause more havoc in terms of budgetary, fiscal, 
administrative and political dilemmas in a large project than in a small one, we 
conclude that, other things being equal, an increase in project size translates into an 
increase in potential trouble for infrastructure development. For instance, a doubling in 
project size results in a doubling in additional fiscal demands for the same percentage 
cost escalation.   
This, finally, translates into a need for an improved planning process and a better 
institutional set-up for infrastructure development and management, to prevent potential 
trouble from becoming real. For suggestions on how the planning process and 
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institutional set-up for infrastructure development and management may be improved, 
see Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg and Rothengatter (1998) and Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and 
Rothengatter (2003). 
 
Do private projects perform better than public ones? 
During the past ten to twenty years, there has been a resurgence of interest in private 
sector involvement in the provision of infrastructure (Wright 1994; Seidenstat 1996; 
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter 2003: ch. 6). One main motive for this 
development has been a desire to tap new resources of funds to supplement the 
constrained resources of the public sector. Another central motive has been a 
widespread belief that the private sector is inherently more efficient than the public 
sector (Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer 1993: 3-4; Ascher 1987; Moran and Prosser, 1994; 
Bailey and Pack 1995; Clark, Heilman and Johnson 1995-96).  
 Large cost escalations are typically seen as signs of inefficiency and in the 
research literature such escalations are often associated with public sector projects. One 
recent study speaks of 'the calamitous history of previous cost escalations of very large 
projects in the public sector' (Snow and Dinesen 1994: 172, Hanke 1987, Preston 1996, 
Gilmour and Jensen 1998). The study goes on to conclude that the 'disciplines of the 
private sector' can 'undoubtedly' play a large part in restraining cost escalations. 
Unfortunately, little evidence is presented here or elsewhere in the literature that would 
demonstrate that private projects do indeed perform better than public ones as regards 
cost escalation (Moe 1987, Bozeman 1988, Kamerman and Kahn 1989, Handler 1996). 
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Moreover, the evidence from what was intended as the international model of private 
financing, the Channel tunnel between France and the UK, actually points in the 
opposite direction with a cost escalation of 80%, or more than twice the average cost 
escalation of tunnels and bridges. 
 On this background we decided to test whether cost development varies with 
type of ownership of projects. Instead of using the conventional dichotomy public-
private, we decided to operate with a slightly more complex trichotomy employing the 
following categories:  
 
1. Private. 
2. State-owned enterprise. 
3. Other public ownership.  
 
State-owned enterprises are corporations owned by government and are typically 
organised according to a companies act, for instance as incorporated or limited 
companies. Other public ownership is the conventional form of public ownership, with 
a ministry typically owning the project, which appears in the public budgets. Many 
variants of private and public and joint funding exist, with all sorts of conditions placed 
by lenders regarding interest rates, issues of risk and return, and packaging of project 
funding. However, with the available data, the grouping must necessarily be coarse to 
have enough data in each group for statistical analysis. A more detailed typology than 
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that suggested above would be desirable at a later stage but is currently not possible 
because of lack of data to support it.  
 Our reasons for subdividing public projects into two different categories were 
grounded in results from previous research (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter 
2003). Here we found that projects run by state-owned enterprises were subject to 
regulatory regimes that are significantly different from those found for projects under 
other public ownership. We concluded that such differences in regulatory regimes may 
influence performance differently.  
 More specifically, in research on the state-owned enterprises running the Great 
Belt and Øresund links--both multi-billion dollar projects linking Scandinavia with 
continental Europe--we had found that these projects may be subject to what we call the 
'two stools' effect (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter 2003, ch. 7). The projects lack 
the transparency and public control that placement in the public sector proper would 
entail. On the other hand, we also found that the projects lack the competition and 
pressure on performance that placement in the private sector would bring about. In 
short, as regards accountability and performance, the Great Belt and Øresund projects 
might be said to 'fall between two stools', as the proverb has it. Following this line of 
reasoning, a recent report from the Danish Ministry of Finance singles out the Great 
Belt and Øresund projects as liable to a 'risk of lack of efficiency' during construction 
and operation due to 'lack of sufficient market pressure' (Finansministeriet 1993: 82). 
However, our studies of the Great Belt and Øresund projects were basically two 
single-case studies. As such they did not permit statistically valid conclusions regarding 
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the effects of ownership on performance. Now, with our sample of 258 transport 
infrastructure projects we wanted to see if the additional data would allow us to 
establish a more general pattern regarding ownership and performance.  
We were able to establish ownership for 183 of the 258 projects in the sample. 
Again means and standard deviations dictate that we treat the three types of project 
separately in the statistical analyses. For fixed links, all types of ownership are 
represented, although sparsely (see Table 1). Tests for interaction with other 
explanatory variables indicate that ownership can be considered alone. Using a standard 
one-way analysis of variance, the effect of ownership on cost escalation is significant 
for fixed links (p=0.028). Looking at the means an interesting pattern emerges (see 
Table 1). State-owned enterprises show the poorest performance with an average cost 
escalation of 110%. Privately owned fixed links have an average cost escalation of 
34%. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, other public ownership shows the best 
performance with an average cost escalation of 'only' 23%. 
 
[Table 1 app. here] 
 
A test of whether the differences are due to differences between bridges and 
tunnels indicates that this is not the case, but the data are too few for firm conclusions. 
For 'other public' ownership against private ownership a classical non-paired t-test can 
be applied, with p=0.589. Therefore, although the mean for other public ownership is 
lower than for private ownership for fixed links this could be due to chance. We have 
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also tested private and other public ownership as one group against state-owned 
enterprises. Pooling other public and private ownership may seem unusual, but it is 
substantiated by the data. With Welch's modification of the t-test we get that p=0.176, 
i.e. non-significance. Other public versus state-owned enterprise gives no significance 
either, with p=0.162.  
The analyses of variance indicate significant differences in cost escalation for 
fixed links on account of ownership, but these differences cannot, at this stage, be 
located more precisely. Again we must conclude that even though our sample is 
relatively large when compared to other samples in this area of research, it is not large 
enough to support a subdivision into three types of projects combined with three types 
of ownership and still support firm statistical analysis. Further research should be done 
here with data for more fixed links. 
Despite these reservations, one conclusion is clear from our analysis of 
ownership and cost development for fixed links: In planning and decision making for 
this type of project, the conventional wisdom, which holds that public ownership is 
problematic whereas private ownership is a main source of efficiency in curbing cost 
escalation, is dubious. This, of course, does not rule out the possibility that other 
reasons may exist for preferring private over public ownership; for instance, that private 
ownership may help protect the ordinary taxpayer from financial risk and may reduce 
the number of people exposed to such risk. But our study shows that the issue of 
ownership is more complex than usually assumed. We find that the problem in relation 
to cost escalation may not primarily be public versus private ownership. The problem 
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appears more likely to be a certain kind of public ownership, namely ownership by 
state-owned enterprises. We expect further research on this issue to be particularly 
rewarding in either falsifying or confirming this finding. 
 For rail projects, private ownership is non-existent in our data. We therefore 
have only the dichotomy state-owned enterprise versus other public ownership. Table 2 
shows average cost escalation for rail. For high-speed rail we again see that projects 
owned by state-owned enterprises have by far the largest cost escalation. The difference 
is highly significant (p=0.001, Welch t-test), but given the available data, which are 
scant and from projects on different continents, it is impossible to say whether the 
difference can be attributed to ownership alone or whether the geographical location of 
projects also play a significant role in affecting cost escalation. For instance, three 
Japanese, state-owned high-speed rail projects significantly influence the results and at 
this stage the data do not allow a decision as to whether this influence should be 
attributed to type of ownership or to the fact that the projects are Japanese, because 
ownership and geographical location are statistically confounded. For urban rail 
projects we find that state-owned enterprises perform better than 'other public' 
ownership, but this difference is non-significant (p=0.179). We conclude that for rail 
projects, too, further research is needed and can be expected to produce interesting 
results. 
 
[Table 2 app. here] 
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 Since all road projects in the sample fall in the category 'other public ownership' 
no analysis of the influence of ownership on cost escalation can be carried out here. 
This, again, is an area for further research, where data on privately owned roads and 
roads owned by state-owned enterprises can be expected to make a particularly 
important contribution. 
 
Conclusions 
In a previous article we showed that large construction cost escalations in transport 
infrastructure projects are common and exist across different project types, different 
continents and different historical periods (Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl, forthcoming). In 
this article we test what causes construction cost escalation, focusing on three variables: 
(1) length of implementation phase, (2) size of project and (3) type of ownership. The 
database used in the tests are by no means perfect. A more robust database, with more, 
and more evenly distributed, observations across subdivisions, is desirable. Such a 
database is not available at present, however. The database provided is the best and 
largest that exists, and it is a major step ahead compared to earlier databases. 
 First, for length of implementation phase the main findings are: 
• Cost escalation is highly dependent on length of project implementation phase 
and at a very high level of statistical significance (p<0.001). 
• The influence of length of implementation phase on cost escalation is not 
statistically different for rail, fixed-link (bridge and tunnel) and road projects, 
respectively. 
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• For every passing year from the decision to build until operations begin, the 
average increase in cost escalation is 4.64 percentage points. For a project in 
the size-range of the Channel tunnel this is equal to an expected average cost of 
delay of approximately a million dollars per day, not including financing costs. 
 We conclude that decision makers should be concerned about long 
implementation phases and sluggish planning and implementation of large transport 
infrastructure projects. Sluggishness may, quite simply, be extremely expensive. 
Consequently, before a project owner decides to go ahead and build a project, every 
effort should be made to conduct preparation, planning, authorisation and ex ante 
evaluation in such ways that problems are negotiated and eliminated which may 
otherwise resurface as delays during implementation. Similarly, after the decision to 
build a project, it is of crucial importance that the project organisation and project 
management are set up and operated in ways that minimise the risk of delays. If those 
responsible for a project fail to do this, the evidence indicate that the financiers--be they 
tax payers or private investors--are likely to be severely penalised in terms of cost 
escalations of a magnitude that could threaten project viability. 
 Second, for size of project we find: 
• For bridges and tunnels, larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations 
than do smaller projects; for rail and road projects this does not appear to be 
the case. 
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• For all project types, our data do not support that bigger projects have a larger 
risk of cost escalation than do smaller ones; the risk of cost escalation is high 
for all project sizes and types. 
• Projects are growing larger over time, but only significantly so for road 
projects. 
 Because the same percentage cost escalation will typically cause more problems 
in a large project than in a small one, we conclude that an increase in project size 
translates into a need for improved planning processes and institutional set-ups for 
infrastructure development and management. 
 Third, for type of ownership we find that the data do not support the often seen 
claim that public ownership is problematic per se and private ownership a main source 
of efficiency in curbing cost escalation. This, however, does not rule out the possibility 
that other reasons may exist for preferring private over public ownership; for instance, 
that private ownership may help protect the ordinary taxpayer from financial risk and 
may reduce the number of people exposed to such risk. The data show, nevertheless, 
that the issue of ownership is more complex than is usually assumed. The main problem 
in relation to cost escalation may not be public versus private ownership but a certain 
kind of public ownership, namely state-owned enterprises, which lack both the 
transparency and public control that placement in the public sector proper would entail 
and the competitive pressure that placement in the private sector would bring about. We 
expect further research on this issue to be particularly rewarding in either falsifying or 
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confirming this finding. It is an issue of principal significance for deciding on the 
institutional set-up and regulatory regime for infrastructure provision. 
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Table 1: Average cost escalation and ownership for fixed links. 15 projects, constant 
prices.  
Ownership Number of cases (N) Average cost 
escalation 
Standard deviation 
Private 4 34.0 30.1 
State-owned enterprise 3 110.0 71.5 
Other public 8 23.1 33.6 
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Table 2: Ownership and percentage cost escalation in 25 rail projects. Constant prices. 
Ownership No. of projects 
(N) 
High-speed rail Urban rail Conventional rail 
State-owned 
enterprise 
9 88.0 35.5 - 
Other public 
ownership 
16 15.0 53.5 29.6 
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Figure 1: Length of implementation phase and cost escalation in 111 
transport infrastructure projects, constant prices. For the regression line, 
the ten projects with implementation phases of 13 years or longer are 
considered as outliers. 
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Figure 2: Box plots of length of implementation phase. 
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Figure 3: Forecast construction costs and cost escalation in 131 
transport infrastructure projects, constant 1995 prices (EUR 1 = US$ 
1.29; 1995). 
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Figure 4: Size of projects 1925-2000. Year of completion and actual 
construction costs. Constant 1995 prices, logarithmic scale. 131 projects. 
(M=million euros, B=billion euros; EUR 1 = US$ 1.29; 1995). 
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